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Abstract 31	
Purpose: Previous discussions of the hot hand belief, wherein athletes believe that they 32	
have a greater chance of scoring after two or three hits (successes) compared to two or three 33	
misses, have focused on whether this is the case within game statistics. Researchers have argued 34	
that the perception of the hot hand in random sequences is a bias of the cognitive system. Yet 35	
most have failed to explore the impact of framing on the stability of the belief and the behavior 36	
based on it. Method: The authors conducted two studies that manipulated the frame of a 37	
judgment task. In Study 1, framing was manipulated via instructions in a playmaker allocation 38	
paradigm in volleyball. In Study 2, the frame was manipulated by presenting videos for 39	
allocation decisions from either the actor or observer perspective. Results: Both manipulations 40	
changed the hot hand belief and sequential choices. We found in both studies that the belief in 41	
continuation of positive or negative streaks is non-linear and allocations to the same player after 42	
three successive hits are reduced. Conclusions: The authors argue that neither the hot hand belief 43	
nor hot hand behavior is stable but rather both are sensitive to decision frames. The results can 44	
inform coaches on the importance of how to provide information to athletes.   45	
  46	
Keywords: streak, fallacy, cognitive bias, choice 47	48	
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Does Framing The Hot Hand Belief Change Decision-Making Behavior In Volleyball? 49	
People perceive streaks every day: A scientific paper is rejected three times in one year; 50	
there are three days of sunny weather; black comes up three times in a row in a game of roulette. 51	
People might believe such streaks are based on bad luck in the case of rejections, on base rates in 52	
the case of sunny weather when living in Florida, and on chance when playing roulette. Even in 53	
cases of independence of sequentially observed outcomes, people tend to behave as if there is a 54	
greater chance of one outcome occurring after the other outcome has occurred three times, such 55	
as believing red will come up in roulette after black has come up three times—a belief known as 56	
the gambler’s fallacy (Ayton & Fischer, 2004). Yet in roulette, winning on red or black has the 57	
same probability and thus the belief does not harm the gambler’s chances of winning. In sport, 58	
however, such beliefs could harm or benefit a team when they drive strategic decisions such as to 59	
whom to allocate the ball.  60	
In sports, fans and players often believe in the opposite pattern to the gambler’s fallacy, 61	
called the hot hand, where streaks are expected to continue (Raab, Gula, & Gigerenzer, 2012). 62	
Whether the sequential outcome of basketball shots is independent has been hotly debated. The 63	
majority of studies have shown that the sequences are independent, among them a study by 64	
Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985), a narrative review by Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab (2006), 65	
and a meta-analysis (Avugos, Köppen, Czienkowski, Raab, & Bar-Eli, 2012).  66	
Regardless of whether it reflects reality, belief in the hot hand can nevertheless influence 67	
the success of a behavior (Burns, 2004). In sports, a positive relationship between the hot hand 68	
belief and the success of a behavior was recently found in conditions in which the base rates of 69	
players were highly variable, not known, or correlated positively with the number of streaks 70	
(Raab et al., 2012). The study used a computer experiment in which participants viewed videos 71	
of successful or unsuccessful attacks from the perspective of a playmaker in volleyball and had 72	
to decide to whom they would allocate the next ball. Results indicated that the belief that either 73	
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Player A or Player B was “hot” changed over natural breaks such as sets, as did the behavior of 74	
favouring one of the players. Thus, the hot hand belief and a behavior associated with it were 75	
changeable. Could these changes have been produced by different frames? 76	
A frame refers to a mental model that is used to perceive a task and influence a judgment 77	
(Soman, 2004). Stability and framing in the hot hand belief and hot hand behavior have not been 78	
extensively studied, and most explanations of the belief have been general in nature. For 79	
instance, in their original study, Gilovich et al. (1985) explained the hot hand belief of basketball 80	
fans and players as a fallacy originating from the law of small numbers. This law describes how 81	
an observer of small samples of hits and misses such as three hits or three misses believes that 82	
the sequence is representative (e.g., Kahneman, 2012). Representativeness ignores the base rate 83	
of the player or how often in a given sequence three hits or misses can come about by chance.  84	
Another account of the hot hand belief that does not consider framing has been recently 85	
introduced in a review of how individual success can breed success by modelling duration, 86	
intensity and frequency of streaks (Iso-Ahola & Dotson, 2014). Although this argument seems to 87	
explain individual behavior when judging one’s own decisions it is unclear whether such effects 88	
easily transfer to observations of the behavior of others in sports. 89	
Experimental evidence suggests that observers use streaks as a cue for an agent’s 90	
intentionality. For instance, if streaks such as basketball shots are performed by a player 91	
intentionally, participants predict that streaks may continue, whereas if a robot performs the 92	
same task, hot hand streaks are attributed to chance (Caruso, Waytz, & Epley, 2012). It seems, 93	
then, that humans are well equipped for understanding the goal-directed behaviors of others and, 94	
critically, also attuned to contextual factors. 95	
A test to understand the effects of agency, given the arguments above, would be to 96	
instruct participants either to judge their own sequential decisions or to observe others. For 97	
instance, in athletes there is convincing evidence that the performance outcome in decision-98	
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making or anticipation tasks is affected by whether the task requires independent choices as an 99	
actor or as an observer (Ward, Suss, Eccles, Williams, & Harris, 2011). Whether such effects 100	
generalize to sequentially (in)dependent choices in sports is unknown, but there is evidence in 101	
non-sports tasks that serves as a basis for predictions (Lyons, Weeks, & Elliot, 2013). For 102	
example, it has been argued that rolling dice or observing someone else rolling dice produces 103	
different predictions of the continuation of streaks (Langer & Roth, 1975). A manipulation of 104	
control (self vs. other) would allow us to determine if framing through agency (one’s own or 105	
others’ movements) has an impact on sequential judgments. This has yet to be explored in hot 106	
hand research and it could have an impact on how to frame sequential choices in sports.  107	
Recent evidence suggests that the rather generic and stable beliefs and behaviors based on 108	
streak perception are also exposure-based and can be altered by the frequency of exposure. This 109	
can be explored by using different expertise groups (Köppen & Raab, 2012; MacMahon, Köppen 110	
& Raab, 2014; MacMahon & Starkes, 2008). Given all this literature, and acknowledging that 111	
agency and exposure are factors in decision frames, another potentially stronger way of 112	
investigating the stability of the hot hand belief and hot hand behaviors would be to manipulate 113	
the judgment frame via instructions.  114	
One type of judgment frame is an outcome frame. A typical outcome frame manipulation 115	
would be to present a problem in terms of gains or losses. For example, Tversky and Kahneman 116	
(1981) presented participants with information about an Asian disease and framed the problem 117	
for participants by either asking them to focus on saving lives or on reducing deaths, which  had 118	
an effect on choices.   119	
Framing may have an effect on the perception of and behavior pertaining to streaks, as 120	
well. For instance, in a study on the hot hand belief, participants were asked to take the 121	
perspective of the playmaker and allocate balls to the best player. This produced more 122	
allocations to the hot hand player. In comparison, when asked to replace poor players, there were 123	
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fewer allocations to a weaker player (Köppen & Raab, 2012). Further, belief in both the hot and 124	
cold hand was reported by participants. If participants are instructed to focus on a cold hand 125	
(streaks of failures) they may be more likely to detect it and change their allocation to a stronger 126	
player, compared to participants who are instructed to focus on wins, who may focus on hot 127	
streaks that they believe will continue. A manipulation of this kind, using different sets of 128	
instructions, would allow a test of whether a generic focus on positive streaks is stable in 129	
different frames, as is suggested by Wilke and Barrett (2009), who propose that detection of 130	
streaks is adapted from the need to detect food sources.  131	
In sum, current research on the hot hand belief and hot hand behavior focuses on stable 132	
behaviors that rely on stable hot hand beliefs. Evidence suggests, however, that both beliefs and 133	
behavior change and are adapted to the information they are exposed to during sequential 134	
choices. Although some individual and situational differences have been shown recently, a 135	
systematic manipulation of outcome framing has not been done. Therefore we conducted two 136	
studies that systematically manipulated outcome frames by presenting different instructions 137	
(Study 1) or different visual perspectives in video clips (Study 2).  138	
If framing alters hot hand beliefs and behavior, participants should give different 139	
responses depending on the frame. Specifically, we predicted that outcome framing using a win 140	
frame would increase participants’ hot hand belief and lead to more balls being allocated to a hot 141	
player than when a losing frame is used. We predicted that framing from the actor perspective 142	
would increase participants’ sense of control and their belief in streak continuation and would 143	
result in a longer continued allocation to a hot player than when framing was from the observer 144	
perspective. Given that framing has not yet been tested in this context, we used two kinds of 145	
framing to explore the general effects of framing on the hot hand belief and the hot hand 146	
behavior. However, we tested the main effects of different kinds of framing independently and 147	
thus no interaction of these effects was assumed.  148	
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Study 1  149	
Method 150	
Effects of outcome framing on the hot hand belief and allocation decisions were tested in 151	
a within-subjects design with the two factors agency frame (actor vs. observer) and goal frame 152	
(win or lose), resulting in four conditions (actor–win frame, actor–lose frame, observer–win 153	
frame, observer–lose frame). Hot hand belief was measured after each condition and framing 154	
effects on allocation decisions were described as mean allocation per condition as well as the 155	
length of allocations continuation to the hot hand player after sequences of one to four 156	
consecutive hits (and vice versa for cold players and sequences of one to four consecutive 157	
misses).   158	
Participants. Twenty-nine students who majored in sport from a university (M = 23.5 159	
years, SD = 3.8, 15 male and 14 female) participated in this study. We chose students who 160	
majored in sport, as they would be able to understand the displayed volleyball situations and 161	
have experience in both watching and playing volleyball during their physical education program 162	
at the university. We controlled for gender, age, and the number of years spent training (M = 163	
5.26, SD = 3.48) as well as for sport-specific experience (sport type: team or individual sport, see 164	
Köppen & Raab, 2012) that could alter choices in our study but found no significant moderators. 165	
Further, we checked comprehension of instructions and motivation levels on a six-point Likert 166	
scale (1 high, 6 low) asking explicitly whether they understood the instruction and whether they 167	
were motivated to perform the task. Results showed high motivation on average (M = 1.4, SD = 168	
.6) and good instruction comprehension (M = 1.2, SD = .7). Debriefing showed no specific 169	
answers from the participants other than acting as instructed. All participants in this study 170	
provided informed consent and the university’s ethics board approved the study. 171	
Materials and Apparatus.  172	
Videos for decision making behavior: We used videos of sequential decision making in 173	
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volleyball to measure choice behavior presented on a computer screen (Raab et al., 2012). 174	
Participants were instructed that the game was the final of the volleyball World Cup. Winning 175	
was thus important. The video clips were filmed from the stands as is typical in television 176	
broadcasts and lasted around 3 seconds each. The videos displayed one volleyball team serving 177	
and the playmaker’s team preparing its attack. At the moment of the freeze frame, the ball was 178	
on its way to the playmaker, thus neither the position of the playmaker nor his movements 179	
revealed any cues for allocation. 180	
Experimental measures of the hot hand belief: We used questionnaires on the hot hand 181	
belief that were validated in previous research (Gilovich et al., 1985; Raab et al., 2012) to 182	
measure if participants believed in the hot hand and if they applied this belief to choice behavior. 183	
The predictive validity was shown in Gilovich et al.’s (1985) belief–behavior experiments, and 184	
Raab et al.’s (2012) studies showed that reliable results could be obtained using a modified paper 185	
and pencil version of the questionnaire. There were two Yes/No questions on current hot hand 186	
belief that were asked after each condition: (a) Do you believe that it is important to allocate the 187	
ball to a player who just successfully performed two or three hits? (b) Does a player who scored 188	
a hit in the last two or three attempts have a better chance of scoring on the next ball compared to 189	
when previously missing two or three balls?  190	
Post-experimental measures of self-reported allocation strategy: There were six questions 191	
after the experiment about allocation strategies (c-g multiple choice questions or filling in a 192	
discrete number, question h is an open question that was labelled by two independent raters with 193	
.92 inter-rater reliability to higher order themes): (c) Which of the two players (A or B) was more 194	
successful, or were they equal? (d) Consider a game in which the last point in the last set will 195	
decide the game. You are the playmaker and allocate the ball. Do you allocate the ball to the 196	
player with the better average performance or to the player who scored the last three attempts? 197	
(e) For your choices in the experiment, how often did you shift your allocation from one player 198	
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who just made an error to the other player? (f) For your choices in the experiment, how often did 199	
you shift your allocation from one player who just made a hit to the other player/keep your 200	
allocation with the same player? (g) How often did you consider at least the last three attempts of 201	
the players for your next allocation? (h)When you considered the last one or more attempts, 202	
please describe your allocation strategy.  203	
Decision making task: The basic task was to decide to which attacker - Player A or B - to 204	
pass the ball, via a keypress on the computer keypad. After participants had chosen to whom they 205	
would allocate the next ball (Player A or B) a clip was displayed in which the chosen player was 206	
either successful (spike) or not successful (spike hits outside the court or hits the net).  207	
There were 176 trials, separated into four sets of 44 clips representing the four conditions 208	
of actor perspective with either a win or a lose frame and observer perspective with either a win 209	
or a lose frame. The number of hits and misses was identical for Players A and B. Within each 210	
set we twice showed three consecutive hits and twice three consecutive misses. These sequences 211	
are real game footage sequences selected from male volleyball games of the national Premier 212	
League.  213	
There were two framing manipulations: agency and goal. In the agency manipulation, 214	
participants were instructed to imagine themselves as either the playmaker (actor) or an observer 215	
(observer perspective). Whether they followed the instruction to imagine themselves as an actor 216	
(actor frame) or an observer (observer frame) was checked in the debriefing. In the goal 217	
manipulation, participants were instructed to allocate the ball to the player who would likely 218	
score (win frame) or to indicate which of the two players would likely not score (lose frame). For 219	
the frame manipulation in which we manipulate the agency, participants were instructed either 220	
(a) to take the playmaker’s perspective and make all the decisions in that role or (b) to observe 221	
the playmaker in the video and indicate from an observer’s perspective how the playmaker 222	
should allocate the ball. For the outcome frame, we instructed participants either (a) to press the 223	
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key that represents the player to whom the playmaker should allocate the ball (seek to win) or (b) 224	
to press the key that represents the player to whom the playmaker should not allocate the ball 225	
(avoid loss).  226	
After the first set and for all following sets of 44 trials a display asked the participants to 227	
indicate how many hits Player A and Player B just had as well as to type in their allocation 228	
strategy for the first 11 trials of the next set (“In how many of 11 trials would you allocate the 229	
ball to Player A” and “In how many of 11 trials would you allocate the ball to Player B”). The 230	
first question was asked to explore to what extent choice behavior was influenced by the memory 231	
of players’ base rates, that is, the number of hits out of the number of trials. The question about 232	
future allocation was used to analyse to what extent allocations change as a result of actual 233	
experienced hit and miss sequences. We used a small (11 out of 44) and unequal number of trials 234	
to evaluate choice behavior (i.e., the unequal number forced a greater number of allocations to 235	
one player). 236	
Procedures. We tested each participant individually in a maximum of 90 minutes, using 237	
written instructions to inform them about the goal of the experiment, and collected personal data 238	
and informed consent. Then we provided participants with the video test of 176 trials. Using a 239	
within-subject design, we counterbalanced the four sets of 44 trials per condition to manipulate 240	
the win–lose and observer–actor framing with a break of about 2 minutes between conditions. 241	
After each trial the participants produced an allocation decision for the next trial. We asked 242	
Questions a and b after each block and Questions c–h only after the experiment. Finally, 243	
participants were debriefed. 244	
Data Analysis. We tested whether framing has an affect on the hot hand behavior and the 245	
hot hand belief. For the hot hand behavior we expected differences in choice variables using 246	
ANOVAs or t-tests between framing conditions. For hot hand belief we asked questions during 247	
the video task and after the experiment.   248	
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For hot hand behavior we calculated (a) the average allocation to Player A and Player B 249	
for each condition; and (b) autocorrelation tests of participants’ choices to provide sequential 250	
analyses of the choices following the autocorrelation claim by Hales (1999) and (c) participants 251	
allocation strategy.  252	
For (b) we used autocorrelation to analyse the sequence of choices by correlating the 253	
original sequence of choices with a sequence shifted by one position (lag 1). An autocorrelation 254	
of 1 means a participant only ever chose one player (i.e., Player A or Player B), and a -1 255	
autocorrelation means a participant always alternated between Player A and Player B on 256	
consecutive trials. Because the base rates of Players A and B were equal and at .5 (5 out of 10 257	
trials are hits) and we had an equal number of positive and negative streaks in the trials, we could 258	
expect an autocorrelation of zero if sequential choices were independent of each other. However, 259	
if participants believed in the continuation of a streak we could expect a positive autocorrelation, 260	
and if they believed in the gambler’s fallacy (after two or three hits a miss on the next trial is 261	
more likely) we could expect a negative correlation.  262	
For (c) we calculated allocation strategy during the experiment, by comparing the number 263	
of trials that represented a win–stay, lose–shift strategy (where only the previous response is 264	
considered, n = -1) to the number of trials in which other strategies were considered (including a 265	
strategy that considered more than the previous attempt, n = -2 or more). A win–stay, lose–shift 266	
strategy counts the number of trials in which participants allocated the ball to the same player 267	
after a hit (win–stay) and changed to the other player after a miss (lose–shift). If the allocation 268	
did not follow a win–stay, lose–shift strategy it was marked as ‘other’. The general tendency of 269	
following a win-stay lose-shift strategy can be assessed by t tests using one or zero as a criterion 270	
of a win–stay, lose–shift strategy (or the mirrored version, win–shift, lose–stay).  271	
For hot hand belief we examined (a) whether the reported allocation strategy for the next 272	
11 trials (how many balls should be allocated to Player A or Player B) and responses to base rate 273	
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questions (how many hits Player A and Player B achieved the last ten trials) queried between 274	
each set of 44 trials, differed based on differences in framing conditions, using chi-square tests; 275	
and (b) answers on questions a,b indicating general beliefs in the hot hand, compared between 276	
framing conditions. 277	
Alpha criterion was set to .05, with expected mean effect sizes given previous studies and 278	
sample size (Köppen & Raab, 2012). Effect sizes are not displayed for F, t values lower than 1 as 279	
these findings may be unreliable.  280	
Results 281	
Hot Hand Behavior. Allocations were equally distributed to Player A and Player B (see Table 282	
1), averaged over all participants and conditions (t values from .11 to 2.7, effect sizes from .05 to 283	
.11, p > .05) and thus reflect the equal base rates of the displayed players. We performed a two-284	
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the number of allocations to the players using the 285	
framing conditions actor–observer and win–loss. We found neither statistically significant main 286	
effects, F(1,25) = 1.6, p > .05,  nor interaction effects, F(1,25) = .41, p > .05, in participants’ 287	
mean allocation behavior. To test our main hypothesis that agency (actor-observer) and goal 288	
(win-lose) framing will change sequential decisions we performed a number of tests. First, when 289	
we analysed the sequential choice strategies rather than average behavior, we found that choices 290	
based on a 1-back strategy—such as win–stay, lose–shift— differed depending on participants’ 291	
condition.  T-tests showed that participants differed significantly in all conditions from such pure 292	
strategy behavior (t values from .21 to 1.4, effect sizes from .04 to .52, all ps < .05) indicating 293	
that sequences of more than 1-back are used. This finding extends previous research on 1-back 294	
sequences in hot hand research (Attali, 2013). Yet contrasting the number of trials using a win–295	
stay, lose–shift strategy with chance level (t-test with .5 as criterion) revealed that a win–stay, 296	
lose–shift strategy is used roughly about the same amount as predicted by chance (t values from 297	
2.27 to 14.4, effect sizes from .42 to 2.67, ps < .05). 298	
Running	head:	FRAMING	HOT	HAND		 	 	 	 	13	
In Table 1 the percentage of trials per condition in which participants followed a win–299	
stay, lose–shift strategy are displayed for up to four sequential hits or misses. We set the x axis at 300	
50% as this percentage of trials using a win–stay, lose–shift strategy would be predicted by 301	
chance if participants ignored the previous hit or miss in consecutive choices. We used a 302	
sequence length of four hits or misses as sequences of three hits or three misses are preceded by 303	
a hit or miss. Participants in the actor condition tended to use a win–stay, lose–shift strategy 304	
more often (F(1,28) = 1.14, p = .07, η2 = .21) than participants in the observer condition, 305	
potentially reflecting a greater perception of control as argued in the introduction. No such effect 306	
was found for the win–lose goal frame manipulation. As we used the same number of hot and 307	
cold hands in the video clips, this finding partly confirms our expectations that framing can alter 308	
sequential choice behavior complementing previous research in basketball (Aharoni & Sarig, 309	
2012; Attali, 2013).  310	
In a second approach to understanding sequential allocation behavior we performed two 311	
additional tests. We (a) compared the number of win–stay, lose–shift strategies between 312	
conditions of different streak length, streak direction, and actor-observer framing only for streak 313	
patterns within the trials. We (b) performed autocorrelations to allow for a general pattern of 314	
consecutive allocation behavior from one trial to another. Both tests should provide us with 315	
information on whether framing has short-term effects on allocation decisions. 316	
First , we performed a three-way ANOVA with sequence length (one to four hits/misses), 317	
streak direction (positive streak of hits or negative streak of misses), and agency frame 318	
(actor/observer) as within-subject factors. The number of win–stay trials increased in positive 319	
streaks (hit streaks) and the number of lose–shift trials decreased over sequence length, non-320	
significantly, F(3, 27) = .6, p > .05. The number of win–stay trials in positive streaks was non-321	
significantly greater than the number of lose–shift trials in negative streaks, as indicated when 322	
we tested the main factor streak direction, F(1, 27) = 3.11, p = .08, η2 = .10. There was no 323	
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significant actor–observer effect or any interaction effects of the number of win–stay, lose–shift 324	
strategies again confirming our argument that hot hand analyses beyond 1-back strategies such as 325	
three hits/misses in a row are a crucial component of the hot hand belief. 326	
Second, we analysed lag-1 autocorrelations for each player over all allocation choices of 327	
176 trials. We found that of 29 participants, 7 had significant correlations in the range of .22 and 328	
.39 either positive (4 times, p < .05) or negative (3 times, p < .05). Thus, for all allocations the 329	
majority did not show a systematic dependence on consecutive allocations. Comparisons to 330	
previous studies indicate that the data are in the ball park of results: Gilovich et al. (1985) had a 331	
significant autocorrelation of 1 out of 12 players and Raab et al. (2012) 13 out of 26. Given that 332	
these autocorrelations are run within sequences of positive and negative streaks this measure 333	
may not be as sensitive as a measure of runs represented in win–stay, lose–shift strategies, 334	
described above. This adds further evidence to our tenet that 1-back strategies are limited in 335	
showing hot hand allocation behavior in contrast to sequences of longer runs as displayed in 336	
Table 1. 337	
Hot Hand Belief During Experiment. The hot hand belief during the experiment was 338	
assessed after each condition when asking about the performance of the players and the future 339	
allocation strategies of the participants. Our results indicate that allocation strategies could not be 340	
explained by false representations of players’ base rates. Averaged over all conditions and 341	
participants, the base-rates of players were correctly recalled by about 1 more or less hit 342	
attributed to a player than the real base-rates (t-tests for each condition between real vs. recalled 343	
base-rates is non-significant, t values from .87 to 1.6, effect sizes from .16 to .30, ps > .05). This 344	
nearly exact recall confirms base-rate recall in previous studies (e.g., Raab et al., 2012). Further, 345	
when participants were asked about their allocation strategies before a next set of video clips 346	
they produced almost identical allocation strategies for Player A and Player B reflecting the 347	
absence of fixed mind sets and reflecting their equal allocation behavior to Player A and Player 348	
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B as reported above.  349	
However, when we analyzed condition-specific beliefs, we found an actor–observer 350	
difference concerning the belief in playing more to a hot player. In actors (using only the 351	
responses to Question a) after the manipulation of an actor instruction), 11 of 14 participants 352	
were in favour of playing more to a hot player, whereas in observers (using only the responses to 353	
Question a) after the manipulation of an observer instruction), only 6 of 15 participants were in 354	
favour of doing so, χ2(1, n = 28) = 4.88, p < .05, Cramer’s V = .93. We found no significant 355	
interaction between the win–lose and actor–observer framing manipulations on playing more to a 356	
hot hand player (p > .05). 357	
Hot Hand Belief After The Experiment. After the experiment we asked participants if 358	
they believed in the hot hand, testing whether the sequential allocation behavior is correlated to a 359	
belief in the hot hand. Over all conditions, 57% indicated a belief in the hot hand. Participants 360	
indicated that both players were equally good and when participants allocated balls, 55% used 361	
information about the base rate and 45% the previous success indicated by a hot hand. We found 362	
no indication that hot hand behavior and hot hand belief significantly correlate, and thus even if 363	
beliefs about the hot hand change as a result of instructions, the average distribution between two 364	
players in allocation performance remained unaltered. However, as previously reported, framing 365	
does alter the sequential strategies participants use to decide whether Player A or Player B 366	
receives the next ball and confirms previous research (Raab et al., 2012).  367	
Discussion 368	
Does framing sequential choices from an actor versus observer perspective or framing a 369	
problem with the goal of winning or avoiding losing change either belief in the hot hand or hot 370	
hand allocation behavior? The answer is yes, but this effect is stronger for the belief system 371	
measured by the questionnaire than for the behavior measured by participants’ allocations. In 372	
contrast to a recent study (Raab et al., 2012), where 91% of the participants believed in the hot 373	
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hand, in the current study fewer participants (57%) held this belief after engaging in behavior 374	
related to the belief. This difference cannot be explained simply by the sport used, the task, or the 375	
sample, as these were the same in the two studies (volleyball, allocation decisions, and  students 376	
majoring in sports with similar experience). One explanation that could be explored in future 377	
studies is the specific within-subject design. Asking the same two questions four times or using 378	
framing instructions may have reduced the hot hand belief.  379	
Mechanisms discussed in general psychology may be candidates for further tests such as 380	
“explicit discounting” or the “mere exposure effect”. Frequently asking about the hot hand belief 381	
may cause explicit discounting of the degree of participants’ belief in the hot hand. Even without 382	
explicit discounting just the “mere exposure” to the belief questions may have changed the 383	
degree to which participants liked the hot hand belief. Up to half of the participants may have 384	
had their levels of liking lowered after the experiment due to too much “mere exposure”, 385	
resulting in less belief in the hot hand (Bornstein & Craver-Lemley, 2004). Further studies could 386	
test these effects by incorporating different between-subject designs and looking for changes in 387	
the belief before, during, and after the experiments. One limit may be the power of the presented 388	
studies. In comparison to Gilovich et al. (1985), who tested only 12 players, the recent papers 389	
have been using approximately 20 participants per group (Köppen & Raab, 2012) or analyzed 390	
streaks for 26 players (Raab et al., 2013) and thus using identical paradigms and sports we 391	
believe power is sufficient. Nevertheless, Arkes (2013) argued that the hot hand has been 392	
difficult to detect because it occurs very rarely and thus further research with larger data sets is 393	
warranted. 394	
In summary, the actor–observer instructions changed the reliance on the 1-back strategy 395	
of win–stay, lose–shift. The actor–observer difference can be explained by framing having 396	
changed the decision problem. Whether such effects can be replicated and extended for similar 397	
choice behaviors may be a matter of design and sample size. Therefore, in a second study we 398	
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tested a larger sample and manipulated the agency (actor–observer) frame in a different way. In 399	
Study 2 we manipulated the visual perspective by making the observer perspective that of a fan; 400	
the actor perspective was that of watching a video as used, for instance, in tactical training or in 401	
scouting.   402	
Study 2 403	
Method 404	
In Study 2 the effects of framing manipulations on the hot hand belief and allocation 405	
decisions were tested in a between-subject design manipulating the agency frame (actor vs. 406	
observer). Rather than using instruction as in Study 1, in Study 2 we changed the video 407	
perspective from which allocation decisions had to be made. Hot hand belief was measured after 408	
the experiment and framing manipulations using the video perspective effects on allocation 409	
decisions were measured as mean allocation per condition as well as the length of allocation 410	
continuation to the hot hand player after sequences of one to four consecutive hits (and vice 411	
versa for cold players and sequences of one to four consecutive misses). 412	
Participants. Two hundred and two students (M = 24.9 years, SD = 2.1, 129 male and 73 413	
female) from a university were tested. None had been involved in Study 1. We randomly 414	
assigned participants to either an actor visual perspective or an observer visual perspective 415	
(dividing the sample equally into groups of 101 participants each). Participants received course 416	
credit as the experiment was part of a lecture integrating theory and experimental studies. As in 417	
Study 1, we controlled for gender, age, and training age (M = 4.31, SD = 2.67) as well as for 418	
sport-specific experience that could alter choices in our study but found no significant 419	
moderators. When each group was asked how well they could imagine the perspective of the 420	
group to which they were assigned, most of the participants (> 70%) indicated good to very good 421	
role identification. Debriefing showed no specific answers from the participants other than acting 422	
as instructed. All participants in this study provided informed consent and the university’s ethics 423	
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board approved the study. 424	
Materials and Apparatus. We used the same paradigm as in Study 1 but manipulated 425	
the video perspective. Clips were identical in structure and hit and miss sequences to those of 426	
Study 1 but differed in their perspective: The observer perspective was from the visual angle of a 427	
fan sitting in the stands; the actor perspective showed the performance of the team from behind, 428	
at court level, as a player might experience while playing or in a team video feedback meeting. 429	
Procedure. We used the same procedure in terms of instructions and questionnaires as in 430	
Study 1, but we asked the hot hand belief questions only once after the experiment. The video 431	
test was applied with the same procedure as in Study 1 (176 trials) with the only exception being 432	
we presented the videos from two perspectives and no win–lose framing in the instructions was 433	
applied. 434	
Data Analysis. The dependent variables were average allocation to players and the 435	
autocorrelation score. Strategy description was identical to Study 1 as far as setting the alpha 436	
criterion to .05 and reporting effect sizes.  437	
Results 438	
We controlled for effects other than framing and asked about experience in observing or 439	
playing volleyball. In both the actor-frame and the observer-frame groups, approximately 85% 440	
indicated that they did not watch much volleyball (fewer than four times a year). Further, skill 441	
level in volleyball was nearly identical, as over 80% reported having no volleyball experience at 442	
the club level.  443	
We found an equal distribution of allocations to Player A and Player B averaged over 444	
participants and conditions compared in a t test (t(201) = .72, p > .05, Table 1). We thus 445	
replicated the findings from Study 1 showing that, in average allocation behavior, there were no 446	
significant differences for an actor–observer manipulation. As in Study 1,we performed further 447	
tests.  448	
Running	head:	FRAMING	HOT	HAND		 	 	 	 	19	
First, t tests with a criterion of 1 (all trials based on a win-stay, lose-shift strategy) or 0 449	
(all trials based on the mirrored strategy) would not be significant if participants always allocated 450	
the ball to the same player in the case of a hit, and changed allocation in the case of a miss for 451	
the win–stay, lose–shift strategy. The opposite would also be the case if players always shifted 452	
their allocation after a hit, and stayed with the same allocation after a miss, the win–shift, lose–453	
stay strategy). This was what we found. Participants clearly did not show a 100% win–stay, lose–454	
shift or win–shift, lose–stay strategy. However, the number of win–stay, lose–shift trials was 455	
significantly different from chance if we used .5 as a criterion for the t tests (t values from 1.67 456	
to 14.39, effect sizes from .12 to 1, ps < .05), assuming that chance in a two-option choice task 457	
with equal base rates of the options at 50% would produce allocation that reflects a win–stay, 458	
lose–shift strategy. Indeed in all but one condition of actors in positive streaks with a streak 459	
length of 1, allocations were at chance levels.  460	
Second, we compared sequential allocations by contrasting the number of trials in which 461	
a win–stay (in sequences of one to four consecutive hits) or lose–shift (in sequences of one to 462	
four consecutive misses) strategy was applied. For this we performed a three-way ANOVA with 463	
sequence length (one to four hits/misses) and streak direction (hit or miss streak) as within-464	
subject factors and agency frame via visual perspective (actor/observer) as a between-subject 465	
factor. The number of win–stay trials increased in positive streaks and the number of lose–shift 466	
trials decreased over sequence length, F(3, 201) = 26.7, p < .01, η2 = .31. Post hoc comparisons 467	
between streak lengths of one to four revealed that this difference was driven by meaningful 468	
contrasts between sequence lengths of 1, 2, and 4, whereas the number of win–stay strategies 469	
was almost identical between streak lengths of 2 and 3. In positive streaks the number of win–470	
stay trials was higher than the number of lose–shift trials in negative streaks, as indicated by a 471	
main effect of streak direction, F(1, 201) = 89,58, p < .01, η2 = .34. There was no significant 472	
actor–observer effect on number of win–stay, lose–shift strategies but we did find a three-way 473	
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interaction of Sequence Length × Streak Direction × Actor–Observer Frame, F(3, 600) = 4.96, p 474	
< .05, η2 = .03. We refrained from further analysis of these effects as they were not predicted.  475	
Thus when we compared sequential behavior between the conditions, we found for both 476	
the actor and the observer perspective that sensitivity to both the hot hand and the gambler’s 477	
fallacy depended on the streak length (Table 1). The number of times participants applied a win–478	
stay, lose–shift strategy increased after a hit until three hits in a row and then decreased as 479	
confirming the rule of three (Hahn & Warren, 2009). This effect was more pronounced for 480	
observers than for actors, although this did not reach significance. The effect is reversed for 481	
sequences of misses, where the win–stay, lose–shift strategy decreased from the first miss to 482	
three misses in a row. This means participants believed that streaks would continue, that is, that 483	
hits would follow hits and misses would follow misses. However, in both cases this belief 484	
changed if participants had already seen three consecutive hits or misses, as streaks in sports may 485	
not be overly lengthy and will not run forever (MacMahon, Köppen & Raab, 2014). 486	
>>>Table 1 about here<<< 487	
Third, to test the dependencies of allocation choices, we performed autocorrelations as 488	
described above. If the video perspective changes the hot hand belief, we should find more 489	
participants in one of the conditions producing dependent sequential choices. When we 490	
performed all trials for each individual in an autocorrelation we found 22 participants (21.8%) in 491	
the observer condition produced significant and positive autocorrelations and 38 (37.6%) in the 492	
actor condition. It is possible that actors, as argued in the introduction and confirmed in Study 1, 493	
perceived a greater sense of control.  494	
Hot Hand Belief During The Experiment. As in Study 1, we analysed if allocation 495	
strategies could be explained by false representations of players’ base rates. We found, averaged 496	
over all conditions and participants, that base-rates of players are correctly recalled by less than 1 497	
more or less hit attributed to a player than the real base-rates (t-test between real and recalled 498	
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base-rates, t(201) = 2.69, p > .05, η2 = .38). This confirms independent empirical evidence to 499	
Study 1 and previous research (Raab et al., 2012). Allocation strategies for Player A and Player 500	
B before a next set of video clips are almost identical and thus influences of fixed mind sets seem 501	
unlikely. 502	
Hot Hand Belief After The Experiment. When asked about their hot hand belief after 503	
the experiment, fewer than half of the participants (47%) indicated that a player has the same 504	
chance of performing a hit after two or three hits as after two or three misses. Belief in the hot 505	
hand, that is, that a player has a greater chance of hitting after two or three previous hits, was 506	
indicated by 31% (actor frame) and 28% (observer frame) of the participants. When we asked 507	
participants after the experiment which of the two players they would like to allocate balls to—508	
Player A with a hit (1)–miss (0) sequence of 101010101010101010 or Player B with a “streaky” 509	
sequence of 111000111000111010, 61% in the actor condition chose the streaky performance, 510	
whereas only 52% in the observer condition chose the streaky performance, nearly reflecting the 511	
equal base rates of the players. 512	
Discussion 513	
Did framing the video from different perspectives conceptually replicate the perspective 514	
framing effects from instructions in Study 1? The answer is yes, the effects of framing were 515	
present in both the belief and sequential behavior. We speculated in the discussion of Study 1 516	
that the reduced hot hand belief may be caused by the within-design of framing. However when 517	
we use a between subject design the general hot hand belief is smaller than in other studies 518	
before (31% and 28%, compared to previous belief between 60-91%). This seems hard to explain 519	
simply by differences in the questions (which were the same as in Gilovich et al., 1989, Raab et 520	
al., 2012) or the paradigm, type of sample or sports (same sport as in Raab et al., 2012). 521	
A new finding of Study 2 is that framing effects can be subtly manipulated. Here we just 522	
changed the video perspective in which the same hit-miss sequences are presented. Further 523	
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research may focus on the impact of manipulating frames more or less explicitly and with that 524	
provide further data on when frames may influence choices in real environments. Finally, Study 525	
2 provided evidence that winning and losing streaks produce decisions that take the streak length 526	
into account. If streaks continue for a while participants believe that streaks may stop and they 527	
thus change their allocation behavior. 528	
General Discussion 529	
The studies used here asked whether framing sequential choices from an actor versus 530	
observer perspective change either belief in the hot hand or allocation behavior of the hot hand. 531	
The answer for both beliefs and behavior is yes. In Study 1, framing participants as observers 532	
seems to have reduced their hot hand beliefs compared to when they were asked to behave as 533	
actors. Observers relied more on a simple win–stay, lose–shift strategy than actors did. One 534	
important difference from previous studies (Gilovich et al., 1985; Raab et al., 2012) is the much 535	
lower number of participants who believed in the hot hand. This finding provides further 536	
evidence that the often-cited stability of the hot hand belief is not as high and stable as 537	
previously thought and this finding also extends notions about differences in the hot hand belief 538	
and behavior between groups with different levels of expertise (Köppen & Raab, 2012; 539	
MacMahon et al., 2014). Whether the difference in amount and stability of the belief is the result 540	
of design features or the samples used is a potential line of future research. 541	
A new finding is that participants in the actor condition did not switch after they had 542	
chosen a player for allocation as often as participants in the observer condition did. When players 543	
exhibited streaks, participants tended to choose the hot player after streaks of hits and the not-544	
cold player after streaks of misses up to about three hits or misses. Thereafter, it appears that all 545	
participants believed that neither a lucky nor an unlucky streak would continue and reversed their 546	
strategy. This inverted-U function of allocation behavior for hot players (or U function in the case 547	
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of cold hand allocations) is important for scouting and predicting the allocation behavior of 548	
opponent teams. The Study 1 finding that the longer the sequence the less likely the allocation to 549	
that player was replicated in Study 2 with a different frame manipulation, indicating that the 550	
video perspective from which participants perceive a situation can alter their belief and behavior. 551	
What is new is the finding that from the actor perspective, players who show sequences of hot 552	
hands are preferred for ball allocation, as indicated by positive autocorrelations in Study 2.  553	
Why did framing influence the belief and the behavior as predicted? We can find 554	
explanations in general psychology. First, it seems likely that when confronted with this 555	
volleyball task, our participants—who were studying physical education or sports science—did 556	
use reference points from experience. Sports experience could produce reference points from 557	
which the perceived behavior of the players in the video can be compared. This comparison 558	
process may change the hot hand belief and the hot hand behavior conceptually replicating 559	
previous evidence (Köppen & Raab, 2012, MacMahon et al., 2014). Framing via instructions or 560	
video perspective may alter such reference points when the decision problem is encountered. 561	
Whether framing also has an influence on the mental representation or memory of previous trials 562	
has not been tested yet, but given the changes we saw in the average choice decisions in hot or 563	
cold streaks, some intermediary processes need to be considered to explain the differences.  564	
Limitations of the current two studies could be overcome by differentiating the influence 565	
of frames at different stages of the decision-making process. As well, sophisticated measures of 566	
internal frames are needed—that is, participants’ representations and memory of previous 567	
performance—which could have an additional effect on their beliefs and choices. For instance, 568	
framing research suggests that we judge winning two lotteries of $50 and $30 differently from 569	
winning $80 in one lottery. Framing using aggregated or disaggregated quantities of hits and 570	
misses is unexplored and may help us understand under which situations playmakers aggregate 571	
performances of players for their allocation decisions. In addition, knowledge of such effects has 572	
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implications for how scouts should provide statistics for teams, as well as the opponent teams 573	
they are preparing to face. There are further limitations that come from the studies themselves: 574	
We were able to use frames successfully with participants, but we by no means know how they 575	
used the frames to produce a specific representation of the problem. Similarly, the actor 576	
perspective in the video clips is not fully identical to a first-person perspective and thus further 577	
study could use stimuli that present the environment from an actor’s head-mounted camera. 578	
Previous research has convincingly demonstrated that the visual perspective in sports changes 579	
the responses in anticipation and decision-making tasks (Farrow, 2007; Williams, Ward, Ward & 580	
Smeeton, 2008). Therefore, future research should test the individual effects of such a 581	
manipulation in a Latin square design. Finally, carry-over effects between conditions cannot be 582	
fully controlled by simply counter-balancing conditions in our design. Similarly, explanations to 583	
account for why about 40% of the participants did not believe in the hot-hand in contrast to 584	
previous studies are beyond this study and need to be tested in varying designs and tests. 585	
   586	
What Does This Article Add? 587	
This article adds to theory and the understanding of sequential decisions in sport by 588	
highlighting the influence of framing. We introduced outcome frames that affect the hot hand 589	
belief and hot hand behavior, indicating that neither the belief nor the behavior is a stable entity 590	
that can be explained by generic mechanisms. Rather, future research needs to understand how 591	
people adapt their strategies when exposed to ever-changing environments. Recent models of 592	
why success breeds success (Iso-Ahola & Dotson, 2014) propose that psychological components 593	
such as individual perceived momentum play a crucial mediating role in explaining behavior. 594	
This explanation cannot be applied to framing-observer effects, however. Future research may 595	
therefore focus on assumptions within these models that specify the likely role of influential 596	
dimensions of perceived streaks such as duration, intensity and frequency. 597	
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The framing perspective on the hot hand belief and hot hand behavior may have practical 598	
consequences in the long run, as well. For instance, coaches could use winning or losing frames 599	
in their game preparation or in time outs during a game that could alter the playmakers’ belief in 600	
streaks as well as their behavior. For example, showing videos of the players or the opponents 601	
from the first-person or observer perspective could alter the belief and behavior evaluation. 602	
Furthermore, in time outs the orientation of a coach’s flip-chart can determine if the perspective 603	
is that of an actor or observer. Whether these effects are positive or negative for performance is 604	
still hotly debated and has not yet been tested in the field by manipulating pregame routines or 605	
instructions in time outs, but it may be worth doing so.  606	
 607	
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